

**A Majlis Perbandaran Subang Jaya v Lembaga Rayuan Negeri
Selangor Darul Ehsan & Anor**

**B HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION
NO BA-25–4–01 OF 2023
SHAHNAZ SULAIMAN J
9 JANUARY 2024**

**C *Administrative Law — Judicial review — Application for — Applicant applied
for judicial review against decision of first respondent in allowing second
respondent’s appeal against applicant’s decision in rejecting second respondent’s
application for planning permission to operate elderly care centre — Whether
D application for judicial review filed out of time — Rules of Court 2012 O 53
r 3(6)***

**E A request was made by the second respondent to the applicant for the renewal
of planning permission to operate an elderly care centre. The second
respondent submitted letters of endorsement from five landowners to the
applicant. Nevertheless, the applicant was not provided with any letter of
endorsement from the owner of the adjacent land. Instead, the applicant
received a letter of objection from the said owner, opposing the second
respondent’s application for planning permission. While reviewing the
F planning permission application, the applicant found that the second
respondent neglected to submit the letters of endorsement from 15 other
landowners. The applicant organised a gathering of neighbouring landowners
and during the meeting, all attending neighbouring landowners expressed
objections to the second respondent’s planning permission. Following the
G examination and consideration, the applicant rejected the second respondent’s
planning permission. The second respondent lodged an appeal with the first
respondent contesting the rejection. The first respondent opted to grant
approval to the second respondent’s appeal (‘the order’). The applicant received
a copy of the order dated 12 October 2022 issued by the first respondent on
H 21 October 2022. Consequently, the applicant filed an application for judicial
review against the said first respondent’s decision. The second respondent had
raised a preliminary objection that this application for judicial review was filed
out of time and hence time barred.**

I Held, dismissing the application with no order as to costs:

- (1) Order 53 r 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘the ROC’) clearly stated that an application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision was first communicated to the applicant.

The order was communicated to the applicant on 12 October 2022 in the presence of the applicant's representative and the deponent for the applicant's affidavit, preceding the formal service of the order on 21 October 2022. Consequently, the timeline for filing the application for judicial review commenced on 12 October 2022, with the deadline set for 12 January 2023. The applicant filed the application beyond the stipulated time, specifically on 18 January 2023, without seeking leave for an extension of time from the court, as mandated by O 53 r 3(7) of the ROC. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the applicant's application for judicial review (see paras 27 & 34).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary]

Satu permohonan telah dibuat oleh responden kedua kepada pemohon untuk memperbaharui kebenaran merancang untuk mengendalikan pusat jagaan warga emas. Responden kedua menyerahkan surat sokongan daripada lima pemilik tanah kepada pemohon. Namun begitu, pemohon tidak diberikan sebarang surat sokongan daripada pemilik tanah bersebelahan. Sebaliknya, pemohon menerima surat bantahan daripada pemilik tersebut, menentang permohonan responden kedua untuk kebenaran merancang. Semasa menyemak permohonan kebenaran merancang, pemohon mendapati responden kedua gagal mengemukakan surat sokongan daripada 15 pemilik tanah lain. Pemohon menganjurkan perhimpunan pemilik tanah jiran dan semasa mesyuarat itu, semua pemilik tanah jiran yang hadir menyatakan bantahan terhadap kebenaran merancang responden kedua. Selepas pemeriksaan dan pertimbangan, pemohon menolak kebenaran merancang responden kedua. Responden kedua membuat rayuan dengan responden pertama membantah penolakan tersebut. Responden pertama memilih untuk memberikan kelulusan kepada rayuan responden kedua ('perintah'). Pemohon menerima salinan perintah bertarikh 12 Oktober 2022 yang dikeluarkan oleh responden pertama pada 21 Oktober 2022. Akibatnya, pemohon memfailkan permohonan untuk semakan kehakiman terhadap keputusan responden pertama tersebut. Responden kedua telah membangkitkan bantahan awal bahawa permohonan untuk semakan kehakiman ini difailkan di luar had masa dan oleh itu dihalang had masa.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tanpa perintah kos:

- (1) Aturan 53 k 3(6) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ('KKM') dengan jelas menyatakan bahawa permohonan untuk semakan kehakiman hendaklah dibuat dengan segera dan dalam apa jua keadaan dalam tempoh tiga bulan dari tarikh alasan permohonan mula timbul atau apabila keputusan itu mula-mula dimaklumkan kepada pemohon. Perintah itu telah dimaklumkan kepada pemohon pada 12 Oktober 2022 di hadapan wakil pemohon dan deponen untuk affidavit pemohon, sebelum penyampaian rasmi perintah itu pada 21 Oktober 2022.

- A Akibatnya, garis masa untuk memfailkan permohonan semakan kehakiman bermula pada 12 Oktober 2022, dengan tarikh akhir ditetapkan pada 12 Januari 2023. Pemohon memfailkan permohonan melebihi masa yang ditetapkan, khususnya pada 18 Januari 2023, tanpa memohon kebenaran lanjutan masa daripada mahkamah, seperti yang dimandatkan oleh A 53 k 3(7) KKM. Oleh itu, mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar permohonan pemohon bagi semakan kehakiman (lihat perenggan 27 & 34).]
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Cases referred to

- C *Akira Sales & Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Nadiyah Zee bt Abdullah and another appeal* [2018] 2 MLJ 537; [2018] 2 CLJ 513, FC (refd)
Jitender Singh all Pagar Singh & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan and another appeal [2012] 1 MLJ 56; [2012] 2 CLJ 165, CA (refd)
- D *Kijal Resort Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Kemaman & Anor* [2016] 1 MLJ 544; [2015] 3 CLJ 861, FC (folld)
Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 54; [1983] CLJ Rep 266, FC (refd)
R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145; [1997] 1 CLJ 147, FC (refd)
- E *Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers' Union* [1995] 2 MLJ 317; [1995] 2 CLJ 748, CA (refd)

Legislation referred to

- F Rules of Court 2012 O 53, O 53 r 3(6), 3(7)
Manpal Singh Sacdev (with Mastura bt Omar) (Manjit Singh Sachdev, Mohammad Radzi & Partners) for the applicant.
Manoharan Malayalam (with Anis Salihah bt Abdul Malek) (M Manoharan & Co) for the respondents.

G **Shahnaz Sulaiman J:**

INTRODUCTION

- H [1] This application for judicial review pertains to the application of the second respondent to renew a planning permission to operate an elderly care centre known as the Noble Home Care Services Sdn Bhd at No 1, Jalan USJ 18/3, Subang Jaya, Mukim Damansara, Daerah Petaling, Selangor Darul Ehsan.

I RELIEFS SOUGHT

- [2] The applicant is seeking the following reliefs in this application for judicial review:

2. Bahawa pemohon diberi suatu perintah certiorari untuk mengakas dan/atau mengenepikan keseluruhan keputusan/perintah responden pertama bertarikh 12.10.2022 tersebut yang telah diterima oleh pemohon pada 21.10.2022 dan yang telah memutuskan bahawa:

- (a) Rayuan (oleh responden kedua) hendaklah dibenarkan dan Penolakan Kebenaran Merancang seperti di Borang C(2) 15.02.2022 (oleh pemohon) hendaklah diakaskan dan digantikan dengan Kebenaran Merancang sehingga 31.12.2024; dan
- (b) Pihak perayu (iaitu responden kedua di sini) perlu mematuhi syarat-syarat yang akan ditetapkan oleh responden (iaitu pemohon di sini);
- (c) Tidak ada perintah kos;

3. Bahawa kos permohonan ini serta kos-kos yang berbangkit akibat daripada permohonan ini dibayar oleh responden kedua kepada pemohon; dan/atau

4. Perintah-perintah dan/atau relif-relif yang didapati adil dan suaimanfaat di dalam keadaannya oleh mahkamah yang mulia ini.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[3] The background facts are garnered from the applicant's affidavit in support dated 17 January 2023 and the exhibits thereto.

[4] This matter pertains to a request made by the second respondent for the renewal of planning permission (Form C(1)), hereinafter referred to as 'the application' to operate an elderly care centre named 'Noble Home Care Services Sdn Bhd' at No 1, Jalan USJ 18/3 Subang Jaya, Mukim Damansara, Daerah Petaling, Selangor Darul Ehsan.

[5] The second respondent submitted 'Surat-Surat Sokongan Jiran Untuk Membuat Perubahan Material Kegunaan Bangunan Daripada Kediaman Kepada Pusat Jagaan Warga Emas' to the applicant for the following landowners:

No	Name and No K/P/Passport	Address	Decision
1.	Junaidarsuad (DR1914062)	No 5, Jalan 18/3 USJ 18 Subang Jaya	No Objection
2.	Norashikin bt Talib (660831-05-5656)	No 9, Jalan 18/3 USJ 18 Subang Jaya	No Objection
3.	Adrien Lee (920708-10-6209)	No 11, Jalan 18/3 USJ 18 Subang Jaya	No Objection

A	No	Name and No K/P/Passport	Address	Decision
	4.	Chan Kuo Jin (951209–14–5993)	No 1, Jalan 18/3 USJ 18 Subang Jaya	No Objection
B	5.	Nvinderjit Singh (590413–10–6595)	No 5, Jalan 18/3 USJ 18 Subang Jaya	No Objection

[6] Nevertheless, the applicant was not provided with any letter of endorsement from the owner of the adjacent land, namely Wong Kim Fatt, residing at No 3, Jalan USJ 18/3. Instead, the applicant received a letter of objection dated 6 February 2022 from the said owner, opposing the second respondent's application for planning permission, citing the following reasons:

- D (a) the buildings within the residential zone are unsuitable for commercial activities, and there is suspicion that the second respondent may be operating without the necessary planning permission for the conversion of land use from residential to commercial;
- E (b) no permission from MBSJ was obtained for the additional alteration and/or renovation of the building from two houses into one plot;
- (c) the additional alteration of the building will affect the fire safety, traffic flow, the environment, cleanliness of waste and foul smell;
- F (d) the operation of the elderly care centre has cause traffic jam within the residential area;
- (e) car parking area is full with visitors' cars of the elderly care centre;
- (f) the presence of visitors to the elderly care centre is impacting the safety and harmony of the neighboring residents, as these visitors are outsiders who have not undergone registration as mandated by the residents;
- G (g) the second respondent has, for the past five years since their establishment, declined or neglected to remit the membership fees to RA USJ 18; and
- H (h) occasionally, visitors engage in disputes with residents concerning issues such as traffic, parking, noise disturbances, and the like.

The letter of objection from Wong Kim Fatt dated 6 January 2022 is exh 'RR3'.

I [7] Consequently, while reviewing the planning permission application submitted by the second respondent, the applicant found that the second respondent had neglected to submit the 'Surat-Surat Sokongan Jiran Untuk Membuat Perubahan Material Kegunaan Bangunan Daripada Kediaman Kepada Pusat Jagaan Warga Emas' for the addresses listed below:

1.	No 3, Jalan USJ 18/3	A
2.	No 7, Jalan USJ 18/3	
3.	No 26, Jalan USJ 18/2A	
4.	No 22A, Jalan USJ 18/2A	B
5.	No 22, Jalan USJ 18/2A	
6.	No 20, Jalan USJ 18/2A	
7.	No 18, Jalan USJ 18/2A	C
8.	No 16, Jalan USJ 18/2A	
9.	No 12A, Jalan USJ 18/2A	
10.	No 12, Jalan USJ 18/2A	D
11.	No 10, Jalan USJ 18/2A	
12.	No 8, Jalan USJ 18/2A	
13.	No 6, Jalan USJ 18/2A	E
14.	No 2A, Jalan USJ 18/2A	
15.	No 2, Jalan USJ 18/2A	

[8] The applicant organized a gathering of neighboring landowners on 8 February 2022 at 10am in Meeting Room 1, Level 2, Majlis Bandaraya Subang Jaya. All attending neighboring landowners expressed objections to the second respondent's planning permission application during the meeting.

[9] Following the examination and consideration in accordance with Jadual 4.14 Klarifikasi Perubahan Material Bangunan, Rancangan Tempatan Subang Jaya 2035 (Penggantian), and Garis Panduan Perancangan Fizikal Bagi Warga Emas (GP031-A) 2018, the applicant rejected the second respondent's planning permission application through Form C(2) issued on 15 February 2022.

[10] Subsequently, on 18 March 2022, the second respondent lodged an appeal with the first respondent contesting the aforementioned rejection. Following a hearing on 12 October 2022, the first respondent, among other decisions, opted to grant approval to the second respondent's appeal and issued the following orders ('the order'):

- (a) Rayuan (oleh responden kedua) hendaklah dibenarkan dan Penolakan Kebenaran Merancang seperti di Borang C(2) 15.02.2022 (oleh pemohon) hendaklah diakaskan dan digantikan dengan Kebenaran Merancang sehingga 31.12.2024; dan
- (b) Pihak perayu (iaitu responden kedua di sini) perlu mematuhi syarat-syarat yang akan ditetapkan oleh responden (iaitu pemohon di sini); dan
- (c) Tidak ada perintah kos.

A [11] The applicant received a copy of the order dated 12 October 2022 issued by the first respondent on 21 October 2022.

B [12] Consequently, the applicant filed an application to obtain leave for judicial review against the said first respondent's decision and the order dated 12 October 2022.

PRINCIPLES RELATING TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

C [13] Prior to considering and analyzing this application, it would be prudent for this court to reflect on the legal principles relating to judicial review. Order 53 of the Rules of Court 2012 provides for the procedures for an application for judicial review.

D [14] It is trite that the decision of a public authority may be reviewed by this court on the grounds of illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety or disproportionality. This review is not confined to the decision making process but also to the merits of the decision.

E [15] In the Federal Court case, *Akira Sales & Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Nadiiah Zee bt Abdullah and another appeal* [2018] 2 MLJ 537; [2018] 2 CLJ 513, the liberal approach on judicial review in *R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor* [1997] 1 MLJ 145; [1997] 1 CLJ 147 has been re-emphasised at pp 571–572 (MLJ); pp 547–548 (CLJ) as follows:

F [45] In the same appeal, Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ (Eusoff Chin in agreement) said that an award could be reviewed for substance as well as for process:

G It is often said that judicial review is concerned not with the decision but the decision making process. (See eg *Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans* [1982] 1 WLR 1155). This proposition, at full face value, may well convey the impression that the jurisdiction of the courts in judicial review proceedings is confined to cases where the aggrieved party has not received fair treatment by the authority to which he has been subjected. Put differently, in the words of Lord Diplock in *Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service* [1985] AC 374, where the impugned decision is flawed on the ground of procedural impropriety.

H But Lord Diplock's other grounds for impugning a decision susceptible to judicial review make it abundantly clear that such a decision is also open a challenge on grounds of 'illegality' and 'irrationality' and, in practice, this permits the courts to scrutinise such decisions not only for process, but also for substance.

I In this context, it is useful to note how Lord Diplock (at pp 410–411) defined the three grounds of review, to wit, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, and (iii) procedural impropriety. This is how he put it:

By ‘illegality’ as a ground for judicial review, I mean that the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable.

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By ‘irrationality’, I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ (see *Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp* [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the courts’ exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe’s ingenious explanation in *Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Bairstow* [1956] AC 14, or irrationality as a ground for a court’s reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though undefinable mistake of law by the decision maker. ‘Irrationality’ by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by judicial review.

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I have described the third head as ‘procedural impropriety’ rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.

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Lord Diplock also mentioned ‘proportionality’ as a possible fourth ground of review which called for development.

[16] Further, the meaning of error of law has also been explained in the case of *Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers’ Union* [1995] 2 MLJ 317; [1995] 2 CLJ 748 in the following words:

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Is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt an exhaustive definition of what amounts to an error of law, for the categories of such an error are not closed. But it may be said that an error of law would be disclosed if the decision maker asks himself the wrong question or takes into account irrelevant considerations or omits to take into account relevant considerations (what may be conveniently termed Anisminic error) or if he misconstrues the terms of any relevant statute, or misapplies or misstates a principle of the general law.

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[17] Founded on these principles, this court will consider this application for judicial review.

A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

B [18] At the onset, the second respondent had raised a preliminary objection to this application for judicial review. The second respondent's preliminary objection is that this application for judicial review is filed out of time and hence time barred.

[19] In this regard, the second respondent cited O 53 r 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012 which reads:

C O 53 r 3(6) An application for judicial review shall *be made promptly* and in any event within *three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant.* (Emphasis added.)

D [20] This provision states that an application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant.

E [21] The second respondent contends that the applicant in this application had been communicated of the decision of the chairman of the first respondent on 12 October 2022 as per the order:

F Rayuan ini yang ditetapkan untuk pendengaran hari ini dengan kehadiran Dr. Ejaz Ahmad Chaudhry, Dr. Sara Ejaz dan Pn. Juriah bt. Yazid bagi pihak Perayu DAN Pn. Fathin Nadhira Bt. Kamarudin, Pegawai Undang-undang dan En Hazman Bin Mahayudin Pegawai Perancang Bandar bagi pihak Responden...

G [22] According to the second respondent, the three months' time period would begin from the date 12 October 2022. In this application for judicial review, the application was filed on 18 January 2023. In the event the date the decision is communicated is 12 October 2022, three months calculated from that date would be 12 January 2023. Hence, the second respondent argued that the filing of this application for judicial review on 18 January 2023 is out of time. As there is no application for extension of time before this court to consider, the second respondent argues that this application is time barred.

H [23] In support of this contention, the second respondent cited the case of *Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor* [1983] 2 MLJ 54; [1983] CLJ Rep 266 as reproduced below:

I Leave should not have been granted to the appellant to apply for certiorari without the time prescribed in O 53 r 1A and neither sought an extension of time nor accounted for the delay to the satisfaction of the learned judge within its explicit requirements. The learned judge had no jurisdiction to do so.

[24] The applicant argues that the date to file this application runs from the date the decision was communicated to the applicant which is 21 October 2022 as per the stamp of acknowledgment receipt of the Form H dated 19 October 2022 attaching the order. A

[25] The second respondent rejects the applicant's assertion, contending that the applicant has not successfully refuted the claim that both the applicant and the deponent for the applicant were present when the first respondent made the decision on 12 October 2022. B

[26] In order to consider the preliminary objection by the second respondent, it is essential for this court to determine when the decision was communicated to the applicant. Was the date 12 October 2022 by the chairman of the first respondent? Or was the date 21 October 2022 as per the stamp of acknowledgment receipt of the Form H dated 19 October 2022 attaching the order? C D

[27] Order 53 r 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012 clearly states an application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant. E

[28] When was the decision first communicated to the applicant in this case? The chairman of the first respondent had on 12 October 2022 delivered the decision of the first respondent in the presence of Puan Fathin Nadhira bt Kamarudin, Pegawai Undang-Undang dan En Hazman bin Mahayudin Pegawai Perancang Bandar for the applicant. F

[29] In the affidavit in support of this application for judicial review in encl 2, the deponent Encik Hazman bin Mahayudin had averred at para 5.14 as follows: G

5.14 Kemudian, pada atau sekitar 12.10.2022, responden pertama telah memperdengarkan rayuan responden kedua tersebut, dan antara lain, telah membuat keputusan-keputusan berikut:

(a) Rayuan (oleh responden kedua) hendaklah dibenarkan dan Penolakan Kebenaran Merancang seperti di Borang C(2) 15.02.2022 (oleh pemohon) hendaklah diakaskan dan digantikan dengan Kebenaran Merancang sehingga 31.12.2024; dan H

(b) Pihak perayu (iaitu responden kedua di sini) perlu mematuhi syarat-syarat yang akan ditetapkan oleh responden (iaitu pemohon di sini); I

(c) Tidak ada perintah kos;

Sesalihan perintah bertarikh 12.10.2022 tersebut adalah dikemukakan di sini dan ditandakan sebagai ekshibit 'RR-11'.

- A [30] According to Encik Hazman, the decision was communicated to the applicant on 21 October 2022. However, based on para 5.14 of encl 2 as reproduced above, it is clear that Encik Hazman was present at the hearing and the decision of the chairman of the first respondent.
- B [31] This would entail that the decision would have been made known to the applicant through the presence of Encik Hazman at the hearing of the appeal on 12 October 2022. Consequently, this would mean this application which was filed on 18 January 2023 is time barred.
- C [32] It is a well established legal principle that adhering strictly to the stipulations of O 53 r 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012 is obligatory. The compulsory nature of these requirements is evident from the use of the term 'shall', indicating that no exceptions are allowed unless an extension of time is formally requested and granted.
- D [33] In *Kijal Resort Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Kemaman & Anor* [2016] 1 MLJ 544; [2015] 3 CLJ 861, the court stated the following pertaining to the time period for filing of a judicial review application:
- E [119] Order 53 of the RHC 1980 sets out a specific procedure for an applicant to comply with in order to enable him to invoke the judicial review proceedings. When such explicit procedure is created, then as a general rule all applicants for such relief must adhere to the procedure, failing which the application would not be entertained by the court. In the present case, there was clear non-compliance by the
- F appellant with the imperative requirement of time set under O 53 r 3(6) of the RHC 1980.
- G [120] It is trite law, that strict compliance with the requirements of O 53 r 3(6) of the RHC 1980 is mandatory. The mandatory nature of the requirements is clearly reflected in the usage of the word 'shall' therein, which means that there can be no exceptions unless an extension of time has been applied for and obtained.
- H [34] Applying the precedent mentioned to the current application the order was communicated to the applicant on 12 October 2022 in the presence of the applicant's representative and the deponent for the applicant's affidavit, preceding the formal service of the order on 21 October 2022. Consequently, the timeline for filing the application for judicial review commenced on 12 October 2022, with the deadline set for 12 January 2023. Regrettably, the applicant in this instance filed the application beyond the stipulated time, specifically on 18 January 2023, without seeking leave for an extension of time
- I from this court, as mandated by O 53 r 3(7) of the Rules of Court 2012. This court therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain the applicant's application for judicial review. See also in the Court of Appeal case of *Jitender Singh a/l Pagar Singh & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan and another appeal* [2012] 1 MLJ 56; [2012] 2 CLJ 165.

CONCLUSION

[35] This court is satisfied that the decision of the first respondent was communicated to the applicant on 12 October 2022. Therefore, this court agrees with the contention of the second respondent that this application for judicial review should have been filed by 12 January 2023 at the very latest. As this application for judicial review was filed on 18 January 2023, it follows therefore that this application is time barred and should be dismissed.

[36] This application is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.

Application dismissed with no order as to costs.

Reported by Ahmad Ismail

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